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MUNICIPAL GERRYMANDERING, STATE GERRYMANDERING,
AND POLITICAL POWER
Howard D. Hamilton*
In the recent, widely publicized Tuskegee, Alabama, gerrymander case,
the Supreme Court struck down a state statute which had redrawn the Tuske-
gee city limits in a capricious fashion so as to exclude virtually all Negro voters
from the municipal corporation.' In addition to its drama, the decision is
significant in two ways: in its intrinsic bearing on Negro suffrage and political
power, and in its possible implications for gerrymandering of state legislatures.2
The suit was another of the legal skirmishes resulting from the rising tide
of Negro political consciousness, supported by national public opinion and
recent legislation, and the various Supreme Court and lower court decisions
which have swept away the white primary and most of the other legal barriers
to Negro suffrage. While Congress was enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1957
to facilitate Negro suffrage by the active assistance of the Department of Justice
and the federal courts, the Alabama legislature was acting to nullify its effects
in Tuskegee by altering its shape from a square to a 28-sided monstrosity which
removed from the city all but four or five of its 400 registered Negro voters.
(A federal system is wonderful!) Subsequently the Alabama constitution' was
amended to authorize the legislature to perform similar surgery, including the
power of abolition, on surrounding Macon County.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had rejected petitioner's
challenge of the statute as an invasion of civil rights,' on the thesis that a state
has virtually unlimited authority over the constitution of its municipal cor-
porations, citing the old impairment-of-contract cases.4 That thesis was proper-
ly squelched by the Supreme Court. Conceding that a state has plenary au-
thority over its municipal corporation, and that normally the exercise of state
discretion is insulated from federal judicial review, nevertheless this power is
subject to the limitations of the federal Constitution and may not be an instru-
ment for a flagrant deprivation of constitutional rights.
A second line of defense of the Alabama statute was advanced by a con-
curring opinion in the circuit court, using the historic precedent of Colegrove
v. Green, in which the Supreme Court declined to disturb an Illinois con-
gressional districting law, challenged as a denial of due process because of the
extreme population inequalities between districts (nine to one).'
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana State Teachers College.
1 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Technically, the statute was not over-
turned; the case was remanded with instructions to consider the petitioner's evidence on
the alleged unconstitutional discrimination. But the Court's opinion leaves the lower court
with no discretion.
2 Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People termed
the decision the most notable civil rights decision since the school segregation cases of
1954. 68 CRIsIS 34 (1960).
3 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
4 E.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), cited at 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960).
5 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
GERRYMANDERING AND POLITICAL POWER
I can see no difference between partially disfranchising negroes and
partially disfranchising Republicans, Democrats . . . urban citi-
zens, or other groups . . .by gerrymander or malapportionment.
I can see no difference between depriving negroes of the right to
vote in municipal elections in Tuskegee and not counting at their
full value votes cast in certain districts in Illinois in a congressional
election .... 6
The Supreme Court, by Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the Colegrove
opinion, avoided a re-examination of the Colegrove doctrine by. resting the
Tuskegee decision, not on the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment,
but on the 15th (the Negro franchise) amendment. "When a legislature thus
singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discrimina-
tory treatment, it violates the 15th amendment."' He distinguished Colegrove
in three ways: this is not an ordinary geographic redistricting, even within
familiar abuses of gerrymandering; Colegrove did not involve racial discrimi-
nation; and Colegrove and related cases involved only a dilution of appellants'
voting power as a result of legislative inaction, rather than this total depriva-
tion of voting rights by a positive enactment.'
Although the broad and explosive issue of equality of representation in
state legislatures and Congress was not reopened in the Tuskegee case, a week
later the Court noted probable jurisdiction of a Tennessee suit challenging an
archaic state legislative apportionment as a denial of equal protection.' This
is a controversy which refuses to die. Since 1946, the Court has had eight
occasions to reject, by memorandum references to Colegrove, challenges of
maldistricting as a denial of equal protection,"0 and there have been other
efforts in district and state courts.1
Some recent litigation suggests a line of attack which might force the
court to revisit Colegrove. A current suit in Maryland argues that the state
court should hold malapportionment a violation of the 14th amendment in
spite of Colegrove.' The argument runs that Colegrove did not decide the
substantive question but merely classified the issue as a political question, i.e.,
one not to be made by the judiciary. The "political question" doctrine is only
6 270 F.2d 594, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1959).
7 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
8 Mr. Justice Whittaker reasoned that the 15th amendment was inappropriate, because
he felt that it guarantees only the same right to vote as it enjoyed by all others within
the same electoral unit. The petitioners would possess the same voting rights as the other
residents of Macon County outside the Tuskegee limits. Consequently he would have based
the decision on the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment, as an improper segrega-
tion of the races - a rationale which would also distinguish Colegrove. 364 U..S. 339, 349(1960).
9 Baker v. Carr, 364 U.S. 898 (1960), on appeal from 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn.
1959).
10 The order in which the Court decided the cases: Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675,
rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 829 (1946); MacDougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); South
v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Remmey v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Anderson v. Jordon,
343 U.S. 912 (1952); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Radford v. Gary, 352
U.S. 991 (1957); Hartfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
11 Asbury Park Press v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960); Scholle v. Hare,
360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960); Matthews v. Handley, 179 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ind.
1959).
12 Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, Equity No. 13920 (Circuit Ct.,
Ann Arundel County, Md.).
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a policy of judicial self-restraint (a means of avoiding hot potatoes), in this
context perhaps binding on lower federal courts, but not on state courts. A
state court is'free to adopt its own policy as to what are political questions,
and several state courts have held that apportionment controversies are justici-
able; numerous state apportionment laws have been invalidated. Ergo, a state
court is free to examine the matter and to hold an inequitable apportionment
a violation of the 14th amendment. Success for this argument would produce
a highly anomalous situation to say the least. It may be noted that two courts
recently have accepted jurisdiction of such suits, and although they have ad-
verted to the 14th amendment, their jurisdiction was grounded on provisions
of state constitutions."3 Also, three state courts have rejected the 14th amend-
ment argument, feeling bound by Colegrove.'4
Efforts to overturn Colegrove in order to secure judicial relief from
malapportionment are likely to continue unabated, because all evidence indi-
cates that inequality of representation in our legislatures and Congress remains,
and apparently has worsened in recent years. 5 This occurs not only because
of legislative default in redistricting, often in defiance of plain mandates in
the state constitution, but also because of the adoption in some states of the
so-called "federal plan," by which an inequitable districting pattern is frozen
into a state constitution. Frankfurter's admonition that partisans in this con-
troversy ought not attempt to involve the courts "in the politics of the people"
is likely to go unheeded by proponents of equal representation, because the
political remedy usually is futile. It is the old problem of belling the cat. How
can the groups who are under-represented in the legislature secure redress there?
Where the malrepresentation is frozen into the state constitution, relief is
barred both in the legislature and in state courts; hence the resort to the 14th
amendment.
It is trite to observe that our most acute domestic problems today are
those of metropolitan communities and that state legislatures, dominated by
small town members and conservative interests, have been myopic about the
problems of metropolitanism. At the bottom of everything is the issue of
representation - the distribution of the keys to power.
13 Asbury Park Press v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960); Magraw v. Donovan,
159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958).
14 Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 920 (1956); Scholle v. Hare 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960); Baum v. Newbry,
200 Ore. 576, 267 P.2d 220 (1954).
15 See data in Dauer & Kelsay, Unrepresentative States, 44 NATIONAL MUNICIPAL REVIEW
571 (1955).
